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It Wasn’t Us: Reply to Michael Brent 
 
Rick Repetti 1 
 
Abstract 
In “Confessions of a Deluded Westerner,” Michael Brent in-
sists no contributions to Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will 
(Repetti) even address free will because none deploy the cri-
teria for free will that Western (incompatibilist) philoso-
phers identify: the ability to do otherwise under identical 
conditions, and the ability to have one’s choices be up to 
oneself. Brent claims the criteria and abilities in that an-
thology are criteria for intentional action, but not all inten-
tional actions are free. He also insists that Buddhism, ironi-
cally, cannot even accept intentional action, because, on 
his analysis, intentionality requires an agent, which Bud-
dhism rejects. I have four responses: (i) Brent ignores the 
other half of the debate, compatibilism, in both Western and 
Buddhist philosophy, represented in the anthology by sev-
eral contributors; (ii) the autonomy of Buddhist meditation 
virtuosos is titanic compared to Brent’s autonomy criteria, 
which latter are relatively mundane and facile, rather than 
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something Buddhists fail to rise up to; (iii) such titanic Bud-
dhist autonomy challenges, and possibly defeats, all major 
Western arguments against free will; and (iv) several con-
tributors address the possibility of agentless agency. These 
responses could have been taken right out of the anthol-
ogy, not only from my contributions. 
 
Introduction 
Coming from a Western analytic philosophical perspective, and bringing 
a degree of conceptual precision thereby, Michael Brent makes certain in-
teresting claims about, and analyses of, certain conceptions of free will, 
for which he is to be commended. However, I see no need to remark spe-
cifically upon what we agree about, but only to remark about those claims 
to which I take objection. Brent raises the level of the discussion by bring-
ing a degree of clarity and precision to certain criteria for free will, but 
not enough, as I hope to show. He also seems unaware that the replies to 
his critique, which should go without saying, are already quite visible in 
the anthology that he critiques, so I doubt anything I will say here was not 
already stated there. 
 
Brent’s Objections and My Replies 
Brent’s main objection against most of the contributions to the anthology 
is that none of them rise up to the level of addressing free will, which he 
simply assumes is the sort of free will that incompatibilists have in mind, 
namely, that which satisfies two criteria: (i) in choosing or doing X, the 
agent could have chosen or done otherwise under identical conditions 
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(which is typically taken to be impossible in a deterministic world),2 and 
(ii) in choosing or doing X, it was entirely up to the agent, such that noth-
ing else caused the agent to do X. These are, respectively, leeway and source 
autonomy: the agent had leeway to make alternative choices, other than 
the one she made, and nothing caused her to do so, in which case she is 
the source of her choice. Brent faults most of the contributors to Buddhist 
Perspectives on Free Will (Repetti), basically, for failing to address these cri-
teria. Instead, he insists, all the criteria they adduce, and all the abilities 
they appeal to, in what they take to be discussions of free will, are not 
about free will at all. At most, he claims, they are about intentional action, 
but intentional actions may or may not be free.  
 Brent thinks the intentional actions that Buddhists mistakenly ap-
peal to, then, miss the mark: they are not obviously free actions. It is as if, 
by analogy, Buddhist philosophers were presenting a theory of human be-
ings, but only set forth criteria that do not differentiate human beings 
from other primates. To keep with this analogy, Brent’s response seems 
to presuppose that there are only male human beings, whereas the better 
part of the anthology that he critiques is devoted to describing female hu-
man beings. 
 Brent is to be commended for noticing that several of the contrib-
utors to Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will (Repetti) do not explicitly address 
the two leading Western (incompatibilist) conceptions of free will, the 
ability to do otherwise under identical conditions and the ability to have it 
that one’s choices are up to one, which conceptions are held by both those 
who think these criteria are satisfied (libertarians) and those who think 
                                               
2 Cf. Repetti (Buddhism), where I argue that there is a causal/counterfactual sense, con-
sistent with determinism, in which agents could have done otherwise under identical 
conditions, based on an analysis of “could” that does not beg the question; see Repetti 
(Counterfactual) for a more elaborate counterfactual analysis of autonomy as consistent 
with determinism. 
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they are not (hard determinists). Both are incompatibilists: they agree 
that these abilities are incompatible with determinism, but the former in-
sists free will obtains and thus determinism is false, and the latter insists 
that determinism is true, and thus there is no free will. 
 Brent is also to be commended for taking a strong position about 
what free will requires. This position is important, for many Buddhist 
scholars entering this discussion are relatively unfamiliar with the incred-
ibly rich taxonomy and dialectical distribution of positions that have 
evolved in the Western philosophical literature on the subject in the past 
century or so. Thus, Brent brings an insistence on a level of analytic pre-
cision where it is admittedly often lacking. After all, Buddhist philosophy 
is a distinct philosophical modality, with its own taxonomy and dialectical 
history. Similarly, Western philosophers entering its fray often need to be 
pressed from the other side in ways that are analogous to what Brent is 
doing here for Buddhists. He is thus, again, correct to claim that the two 
criteria that (roughly, only half of) Western analytic philosophers con-
sider central to free will are the two he presses, namely, leeway autonomy, 
the ability to do otherwise under identical conditions, and source autonomy, 
the ability to have it be the case that one’s choices and actions are up to 
oneself.  
 However, roughly only half of the positions in logical space—that 
is, within the matrix of logical possibilities—for the free will problem are 
positions defined by those two criteria. That is, those two criteria define 
the views of incompatibilists, those who think free will and determinism 
are incompatible. The other half of the matrix of positions is occupied by 
compatibilists, those who think free will and determinism are compatible. 
Almost all compatibilists reject the idea that leeway autonomy or source 
autonomy are necessary for free will, whether they are Western or Bud-
dhist philosophers. Brent seems not to address the fact that most of the 
contributors to the anthology are compatibilists, but instead his account 
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gives the impression that they are simply confused about the criteria they 
deploy, as if they are trying to talk about free will, but are too conceptually 
confused to successfully participate intelligently in the discussion (as if 
the only intelligent discussion here is the incompatibilist one). This inter-
pretive posture borders on the straw man fallacy. On behalf of the major-
ity of compatibilist contributors to the anthology, I can safely reply, it 
wasn’t us! 
 Insofar as Brent represents the Western critique of Buddhist views 
of free will, he also misrepresents half of the Western view of free will: for 
the other (compatibilist) half of positions in the Western philosophical 
matrix of positions on free will is roughly homologous with the (compat-
ibilist) positions in the Buddhist philosophical matrix. Brent gives the mis-
leading impression that (analytically precise) Western philosophers 
would reject (analytically imprecise) Buddhist views of free will, but that 
is significantly misleading. For half of the same matrix of logical possibil-
ities (incompatibilist and compatibilist) obtains in both Western and Bud-
dhist logical space, so to speak. Logic is logic, and the question of incom-
patibilism versus compatibilism is a purely logical question: Is free will 
logically compatible with determinism? Thus, whereas Brent does raise 
the level of precision in the debate, by insisting that Buddhists explicitly 
address the criteria for leeway and source autonomy, he does not raise it 
sufficiently.  
 Brent quotes some prefacing remarks that I used in the anthology 
to sketch some of the features of our intuitions about the problematic na-
ture of our conception of free will, which I made simply as opening re-
marks about the complexity of the problem, and he apparently dismisses 
them as failing to uniquely define free will in accordance with his own 
very specific incompatibilist conception and analysis. Similarly, he does 
this sort of thing with almost all the other divergent conceptions of free 
will addressed by the several contributing authors in the anthology. 
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Again, without really arguing for their validity or necessity, Brent uses 
those two incompatibilist conceptions of free will that he takes to be de-
finitive of the Western analytic understanding of the subject, namely, lee-
way and source autonomy, as the gold standards for evaluating the vari-
ous elements of autonomous agency under consideration among the di-
vergent voices within the Buddhist philosophical discussion, and implic-
itly rejects them all on the ground that that they are not identical with his 
standard. In a sense, Brent seems to ignore many elements of (compatibil-
ist) nuance to be found in the variety of perspectives he lumps together 
as, essentially, failing to be incompatibilist. Again, however, there are 
Buddhist compatibilists, so pressing incompatibilist claims is not enough 
to shift the burden of proof onto compatibilists. To shift the burden, more 
would be needed than simply assuming incompatibilism is correct, from 
which assumption anything compatibilist would fail automatically. But 
that would beg the question against compatibilism. It is not an obvious 
fact that incompatibilism is true. 
 Brent makes a similar move in interpreting all compatibilist crite-
ria as criteria for intentional action, as opposed to criteria for free will. He 
takes various remarks that the contributors make regarding certain fea-
ture of agency or will and argues that they are not definitive features of 
his two leading conceptions of free will simply because they (also, I would 
add) happen to be features of something more general than his narrowly-
defined incompatibilist conception of autonomy, namely, intentional ac-
tion. That is, he rejects certain (compatibilist) conceptions of free will ad-
dressed by various contributors on the grounds that they are criteria or 
features of intentional action in general, but not constitutive of all and only 
those intentional actions that are free. But it is not at all clear that Bud-
dhist philosophers grappling with the question whether there is any room in 
Buddhism for free will have accepted the Western philosophical task of iden-
tifying necessary and sufficient conditions for incompatibilist free will, nor that 
they are taken in by the Western philosophical dialectic or language game 
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of first trying to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the con-
cept before considering whether there are general doctrinal reasons in 
Buddhism to be receptive to the idea at all.  
 To the contrary, Buddhist philosophers are in the very earliest 
stages of explicitly trying to come to philosophical grips with the Western 
philosophical conception free will—whether compatibilist, incompatibil-
ist, some blend of both, or neither. The anthology is properly entitled to 
be precisely about “Buddhist Perspectives” (plural), and the sub-title ends 
with a question mark, “Agentless Agency?”—indicating the open-ended, 
exploratory nature of that question. Pertinently, there are no agreed-
upon necessary and sufficient conditions for free will in Western philoso-
phy anyway. To the contrary, compatibilists and incompatibilists radi-
cally disagree about what constitutes free will, and, crucially, compatibil-
ists accept as criteria for compatibilist free will precisely all the Buddhist 
criteria Brent rejects on the grounds, essentially, that they are not incom-
patibilist criteria. Within the dialectical conflict between compatibilism 
and incompatibilism, however, that is circular reasoning: it begs the ques-
tion against compatibilism.  
 Western philosophers who specialize in free will frequently, if not 
typically, speak past each other in defining the concept in ways that are 
or are not compatible with determinism, or indeterminism, or both, or 
neither. On analysis, then, Brent’s insistence upon rejecting divergent 
Buddhist conceptions of features of agency that matter within the radi-
cally different conceptual framework of Buddhism on the ground that they 
are not his particularly preferred Western philosophical criteria, when 
the latter do not constitute an accepted consensus, is unwarranted. It also 
seems to beg the question against Buddhism, as if to reject Buddhism be-
cause it is not identical with Western philosophy. 
 Brent adds a more serious irony to this line of criticism, after hav-
ing first tried to establish it. The irony is that, whereas the Buddhists in 
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question have allegedly failed to even adduce correct criteria for free will, 
namely, Brent’s (incompatibilist) criteria, offering what on his analysis 
turn out only to be criteria for intentional action, not all of which is free, 
Brent argues that the Buddhist cannot even have that weaker model of 
mere intentional action. Pressing his own Western conception of agency, 
Brent insists that agents are necessary for intentional actions, but Bud-
dhism rejects the agent or self. Thus, any Buddhists who think there can 
be free will must be doubly confused: There can be no free will for Bud-
dhists if the only criteria they offer for free will turn out to be merely cri-
teria for intentional action, and there can be no intentional action without 
an agent, but there are no Buddhist agents!  
 To further develop my above analogy with the theory of human 
beings, it is as if the Buddhist not only offered only criteria that do not 
distinguish between primates and humans, but it is as if Buddhism also 
rejects the existence of mammals, in which case there cannot even be 
Buddhist primates because there cannot be primates if there are no mam-
mals. On Brent’s analysis, then, those Buddhists who think there can be 
free will must be incredibly confused. What is more confusing is how 
Brent seems not to have noticed the many arguments and analyses 
throughout the anthology which address the issue of agentless agency, a 
theme explicit in the anthology’s subtitle. Again, the responses I am offer-
ing to Brent’s criticisms were all in the anthology.  
 I have noted in prior writings that the very concept of free will is 
complex and contested, particularly in my first book on the subject (Coun-
terfactual)—a primarily Western analytic approach, but significantly in-
formed by Buddhist ideas—where I devoted an introductory chapter to 
defining several dozen conceptions of, and positions on, autonomy, each 
with many concatenations, and many divergent elements of agency. In 
that book, I also devoted a chapter to constructing and defending a com-
prehensive theory of the will, which subsumes all other leading theories of 
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the will and of free will. As noted above, Brent makes a point of differen-
tiating between intentional agency and free will, the latter being a subset 
of the former, but this differentiation is just an equivalent description of 
the difference between the will (volitional intentionality, albeit under a dif-
ferent description) and free will. I have described autonomy (Counterfac-
tual; Buddhist) as a control-theoretic volitional ability spread across the en-
tire spectrum of voluntary behavior, which for enlightened beings, ad-
vanced yogis, and other meditation virtuosos includes many things that 
are not normally considered voluntary, and as admitting of degrees, with 
those virtuosos possessing the highest degree, analogous to Olympic ath-
letes of autonomy, relative to which Brent’s gold standards, mere leeway 
and source autonomy, are amateur abilities, e.g., the ability to have or-
dered the tofu, despite having ordered the seitan, and it being up to me 
that I did so. 
 Other contributors to the collection, e.g., Meyers, Wallace, McRae, 
etc., have made similar observations Thus, there seems to be a straight-
forward sense in which the descriptions of free will offered by the con-
tributors and the descriptions attributed to them and critiqued by Brent 
are not the same. Contrary to the impression Brent gives to the effect that 
our criteria fail to meet his standard, we have offered criteria of free will 
that are stronger than Brent’s criteria, not weaker. Again, the positions he 
seems to critique are not the ones we offered in the anthology. Who was 
it that offered those positions? It wasn’t us! 
 Returning to the issue of agentless agency, Brent seems to miss the 
subtleties of the overall Buddhist framework as reflected, for example, in 
the paradox of control (implicit in the subtitle of the collection, Agentless 
Agency?), to the effect that the more control contemplative agents possess, 
the less substantive their agency appears to them. Plenty was said in the 
anthology to differentiate between various different senses of the self, as 
well as different senses in which the self may be thought to be illusory, 
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e.g., not necessarily non-existent, but only existing in a way that differs 
from the way it appears to exist to the unenlightened. Recall, for example, 
Abelson’s careful analysis of Siderits’s “shifting coalitions” model of the 
self, Harvey’s model of the “empirical” self, Aronson’s “psychological” 
versus “metaphysical” conceptions of the self, and, among others, my own 
description of the inverse relationship between an increasing autonomy 
and a decreasing self-sense attendant upon progress along the Buddhist 
path.  
 This latter example—that of the inverse relationship between in-
creased agency and a decreased sense of a substantive agent—is admit-
tedly somewhat paradoxical, which is one of the reasons I ended the sub-
title of the anthology with interrogatory punctuation (Agentless Agency?), 
but the idea is not incoherent. From the vantage of Brent’s paradigm for 
incompatibilist free will, the Buddhist paradigm reverses things, for on his 
Western view, the stronger the sense of self, the more autonomy. Alt-
hough the Buddhist paradigm is problematic from Brent’s perspective, ac-
cording to which latter an agent is required for agency, the same sort of 
inverse idea was made by a number of the other contributors to the an-
thology. It was also made fairly perspicuously in Federman and Ergas (in 
this Special Issue), in their analysis of the phases of meditative progress, 
according to which there is a cyclical shifting between efforts at control 
and efforts at non-control, with the latter paradoxically enhancing the 
former. Gold’s analysis (in this Special Issue) also arguably adds a level of 
nuance to the paradox of control to be found in the Buddhist understand-
ing of agency. In fairness to Brent, Federman and Ergas did not appear in 
the original collection, nor did Gold. However, again, enough was articu-
lated along similar lines throughout the edited collection that Brent is cri-
tiquing.  
 Although it also did not come out until after Brent’s article had 
been submitted, my monograph, Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will, goes 
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into the paradox of control in great detail, and emphasizes the extent to 
which libertarian-type, allegedly “strong” Western philosophical concep-
tions of free will pale in comparison with the sort of agency exhibited by 
Buddhist meditation virtuosos. However, I argued for that claim in detail 
in the anthology (Buddhist) and in previous writings (Meditation; Possibil-
ity). I also argued in both the anthology (Buddhist) and (in greater detail) 
in the monograph (Buddhism) that the abilities Brent thinks are insufficient 
for free will, according to his allegedly “strong” criteria, are sufficient to 
challenge and possibly defeat all the most powerful Western philosophical 
arguments against free will, including the Consequence Argument, the 
Manipulation Argument, the Randomness Argument, the Luck Argument, 
and the Impossibility Argument.3 How such an effective model of free will 
could be weaker than Brent’s criteria for free will escapes me.  
 Buddhist meditation virtuosos, the mental equivalent of Olympic 
athletes, can have the state of mind they want to have and not have the 
state of mind they want not to have, and so on for the volitions they want 
to have or lack, the emotions they want to have or lack, the attention they 
want to have or lack, etc., which is something I also emphasized in the 
edited collection which Brent thinks makes no mention of criteria suffi-
cient for autonomy. These titans of autonomy possess the maximal sort of 
autonomy that is biologically possible, so to speak, for human beings, 
namely, mental freedom, freedom of the mind, or mental autonomy. 
Whereas Harry Frankfurt differentiated between freedom of action as being 
able to act on one’s desires (what Brent treats as intentional action) and 
freedom of the will as being able to have the sort of will one wants to have 
                                               
3 The gist of that set of arguments is that the mental freedom possessed by the advanced 
meditation practitioner is secured regardless of whether the conditions feeding into the 
practitioner’s mental states are, respectively, deterministic, manipulated, indeterminis-
tic, a matter of luck, or influenced by conditioning. A concise version of these arguments 
is presented in the anthology (Buddhist), but they are spelled out in increasingly greater 
detail in Repetti (Meditation; Possibility; and Buddhism), in that order. 
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(that is, one is able to act only on the desires one wants to act on and to 
not act on the desires one wants to act on), the Buddhist’s freedom of the 
mind is being able to have the sort of mental state one wants to have, and 
to not have the sort of mental state one wants not to have. This broader 
category of mental autonomy includes not only freedom of action and free-
dom of the will, but freedom of attention, freedom of emotion, and free-
dom of perception, among other freedoms ranging over anything volun-
tary and even potentially voluntary. (Recall, advanced yogis can control 
functions not normally accessible to will in the autonomic nervous sys-
tem.) These claims are fully developed and defended in my recently pub-
lished monograph (Buddhism).  
 As many contributors to the anthology (Buddhist) make these 
claims, and in light of my claims in this article, it is unclear how Brent 
could maintain that the contributions in the anthology fail to rise to the 
level of his allegedly strong criteria for free will. The opposite seems more 
obvious. 
 Recall that Brent claimed that there cannot even be intentional ac-
tion without a self. I disagree, but not only on Buddhist grounds. On Frank-
furt’s analysis, mentioned above, intentional action is analyzed as free-
dom of action, being able to act on one’s desires, or to perform actions 
that one wants or intends to perform. For Frankfurt, importantly, inten-
tional action is insufficient for free will because young children, animals, 
and mentally ill adults—all of whom are beings we do not normally hold 
morally responsible—are able to act on their intentions: the horse, tod-
dler, or elderly person suffering severe dementia is able to run to the left 
upon the desire or intention to do so. It is highly doubtful that any of them 
have a sense of self, much less an actual self, but acting on volitional im-
pulse does not require a self. For Frankfurt, freedom of the will, rather, 
requires being able to have the sort of intentions or will that one wants to 
have. Some have objected to Frankfurt that higher-order desires (wanting 
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these intentions to be effective, as opposed to those intentions) can arise 
deterministically. Thus, they can also arise in the absence of a self. Argu-
ably, the rat, seeing food to its left and a cat to its right, might be able to 
form a higher-order intention not to act on its first-order desire for the 
food. Whether rats have selves, however, is questionable enough to 
ground the idea that it is not incoherent or contradictory to think 
agentless actions are possible. 
 Importantly, and ironically, the Buddhist, in seeing through the 
constructed nature of the self, is able to have the sort of self he wants to 
have: he has freedom of the self. Although the general goal of Buddhism may 
be described as freedom from the self, this latter freedom can be interpreted 
coherently as freedom from the faulty interpretation of the self that gives 
the illusory, suffering-causing impression that the self is an unchanging, 
immaterial, executive homunculus riding above and apart from the psy-
chophysiological collection of our parts, which does not necessarily entail 
the obliteration of subjectivity, experiential or phenomenological per-
spectivalism, the ability to act on appropriate volitions (like compassion), 
the ability to appropriate one’s parts and experiences in narrative 
memory, and/or a host of other abilities and elements that may be able to 
play a causal/functional role in the embodied mental life of an enlight-
ened or spiritually advanced being, a being who obviously can speak, walk, 
eat, and perform intentional actions in a highly disciplined and orderly, if 
not elegant, manner. This claim arguably applies not only to the Buddha, 
but also to those titanic bodhisattvas who intend to continue being reborn 
until all sentient beings attain nirvana.  
 In order to attain freedom from the self, one might add, one must 
first cultivate freedom of the self, the ability to deconstruct the self, de-
tach from its entrenched volitional and related dispositions, and recon-
struct a more enlightened, liberated, malleable, but functional self in ac-
cordance with one’s higher-order (Buddhist) values. I see no reason why 
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beings in possession of such a variety of mental freedoms cannot engage 
in intentional actions that are free. Surely, they are such that they not 
only could choose the seitan (otherwise) when they actually chose the 
tofu—a fairly mundane, facile ability, but they can have a mental state, a 
sense of self, volitions, and emotions, among other things, that are en-
tirely up to them, and that can be otherwise.  
 
Conclusion 
It strikes me as reasonable to think that if anyone is autonomous in Brent’s 
sense, then surely so are Buddhist titans of mental autonomy.  
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